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Summary
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) contracts with an extensive network 
of non-profit and for-profit providers for the delivery of employment programmes. 
Over the past ten years there has been significant change and the Government 
now has committed to a strategy of ‘welfare market’ reform. This will involve 
‘black box’ contracts that are less prescriptive about processes and will reward 
providers on the basis of getting participants into sustained employment. The 
principles of this strategy will be applied first to the ‘Flexible New Deal’ (FND) and 
80 per cent of funding for external contractors will be paid for placing participants 
into jobs.
Employment programmes are designed to provide enhanced assistance to service 
users with particular barriers to entering or staying in employment. Despite the 
positive impacts of many programmes, evidence suggests that most of them, 
whether delivered by public agencies or external providers, are less effective 
in meeting the needs of the ‘hardest to help’. This outcome can be a function 
of poor programme design but it also reflects the reality that the front line 
delivery and intensity of employment assistance is impaired by the constraints of 
the available funding, the character and scale of job opportunities and the 
tractability of the barriers faced by some of the hardest to help. The particular risk 
of outcome-based payment systems is, however, that they may provide greater 
incentives for ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’, where providers work most with those 
who are more easily placed and provide a minimal service to the harder to help.
In this context the DWP Commissioning Strategy stresses the importance attached 
to overall ‘excellent customer experience’. It commits also to ‘trial different models 
of outcome payments’ and work with providers to ‘develop more sophisticated, 
differentiated models’ that identify service users who may be helped quickly and 
those who need more intensive support. Such a differential payment model may 
have the potential to increase the number of overall outcomes secured and target 
extra incentives at the harder to help.
2 Summary
The research
This study reviewed four countries which make extensive use of job outcome 
performance-based contracting. It assessed how the hardest to help were 
identified and variations in the use of differential payments and considered how 
such systems sought to reduce ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’.
The transition to performance-based contracting in training and employment 
programmes started in the USA. Most federal and state programmes use measurable 
performance standards and include both positive and negative incentives to drive 
service delivery. There are variations in performance standards and contracts 
used throughout the different states. The contract models most relevant to 
British interest in differential pricing include those that ‘pay-for-performance’ and 
‘milestone’ contracts, where providers are paid for a sequence of achievements 
and outcomes including job entry and retention. 
The study reviews two such contracting systems – the pay-for-performance 
contracts used in New York City and the milestone payment system used in 
Oklahoma. 
Significantly, findings from US evaluations show that the relatively short-term 
employment-related performance standards rewarded in programmes are not 
good indicators of long-term impacts. A review of welfare to work studies that 
measured three year effects found that average earnings levels were most closely 
associated with the largest impacts for the most disadvantaged. This suggests that 
performance standards that reward attainment of increased earnings levels could 
be an important indicator of effectiveness in a differential pricing system.
Other countries were influenced by US developments and GB was the first European 
country to extensively use ‘output-related funding’. Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs) and Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) delivered a wide range of 
training and enterprise programmes and trainees were independently assessed 
and endorsed if they had ‘special needs’.
Many TECs paid flat rate fees for training weeks delivered with differential 
payments for high cost occupational areas, such as engineering, and for those 
with endorsed special needs. Over time the funding system shifted the focus of 
programme activity towards lower cost provision that reduced places for higher 
cost trainees in general and special needs groups in particular. The additional 
incentives in the TEC funding system for ensuring such groups’ needs were met 
were weak. Local flexibility resulted in significant variation in the availability and 
adequacy of provision for the most disadvantaged, even in neighbouring areas. 
Differential pricing has been used too in Employment Zones (EZs). Initially, this 
meant a higher payment premium for long-term unemployed participants but 
subsequently involved higher payments for those who were re-referred after a 
prior period of EZ participation. The EZ funding model also contained incentives 
that encouraged speed of job placement and militated against parking. DWP 
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transferred 21 weeks of individual benefit payment to the provider who was 
responsible for paying the participant for up to 26 weeks. The provider retains any 
surplus not used within 21 weeks but is liable for the extra five weeks payment, 
thereby inducing the provider to work with all participants before they reach this 
point.
Job outcome contracts have been central to the design of the new market-based 
employment services systems introduced in Australia and the Netherlands. The 
fees paid to Australian Job Network (JN) providers reflect the intensity of service 
provided and the risk involved in placing the job seeker in work. Job seekers 
classified as ‘highly disadvantaged’ are eligible for immediate access to intensive 
assistance and the provider is able to draw down a higher payment from a Jobseeker 
Account. If job seekers have special needs (such as mental health problems) that 
cannot be met by the JN, they may be referred to a range of specialist performance-
rewarded assistance. 
In the Netherlands the reintegration market has undergone successive adaptations 
as the Dutch social insurance department has sought to improve the efficiency 
of its contracted provision, personalise support and target intensive services at 
harder to help participants. The initial tendering system involved relatively small 
contracts designed to tackle the barriers of particular groups with prices and 
outcome payment terms being differentiated according to assessed distance 
from the labour market. The tender system has now been displaced by a modular 
purchasing framework and Individual Reintegration Agreements. These ‘IROs’ give 
participants more personal control over services and pay contractors higher fees 
and outcome payments for working with more disadvantaged participants.
Key findings
The evidence reviewed suggests that minimising cream-skimming, creaming and 
parking is a key implementation and management challenge in performance-
based and output-related funding systems. 
In many programmes there is no differentiation in prices for employment outcomes. 
There are various ways, however, in which the systems reviewed have tried to target 
assistance. These include the definition or endorsement of eligible groups to be 
served; the requirement that particular quotas of participants with greater needs 
are represented amongst outcomes and the design of specific tenders that target 
services at particular hard to help groups. There is often specialist supplementary 
outcome-focused provision offering rewards to providers for achieving milestones 
and employment outcomes. Such provision is particularly important for groups 
who need to stabilise their circumstances as part of their involvement in, or 
progression to, ‘work first’ programmes. 
Different fees and outcome payments were used in the two-tier system of 
employment service provision in New York. The initial tier was paid lower outcome 
fees on the assumption that early placements would be less costly. The second 
4tier paid higher outcome fees for those not placed in this first phase. There were 
problems, however, with fragmented service delivery and evidence of parking and 
creaming. A new service delivery model now integrates provision with significant 
bonuses for placing sanctioned participants into employment.
Australia’s differential pricing system for highly disadvantaged job seekers has 
faced sustained controversy about creaming and parking, and playing of the 
system by some providers. The challenge remains how to devise an evidence-
based classification and pricing system that targets the hardest to help, is relatively 
easy to administer and does not create perverse incentives. Policy makers have 
had to buttress such incentives with quarantined funds for employment barrier 
reduction, greater scrutiny of parking and adjustments to the Star Rating system.
Policy implications
There are contending views on the success of performance-based contracting in 
the countries reviewed. It is difficult, however, to make robust comparisons or to 
disaggregate the impacts of contract design from those of other policy changes. It 
is still harder to isolate the relationship between different contract prices and the 
impacts of employment programmes, although cost benefit analyses give some 
insight into financial effectiveness.
There is no simple model that DWP could import but there are alternative funding 
models that suggest ways in which the pricing and contracting system may be 
used to encourage providers to work with higher risk, higher cost participants. 
There is some evidence from the Netherlands, for example, that such a ‘progressive 
pricing’ system is in use where contractors receive increased premiums in relation 
to the proportion of a fixed cohort of cases they place in employment. 
The Australian Productivity Commission proposed that its Government test 
a ‘stepped’ or marginal payment system that increases payment levels in line 
with outcome rates. Work Directions has proposed a ‘target accelerator’ with a 
sequence of differential fees for each segment of a specific claimant population. 
The financial viability and profitability of the provider would require them to ‘dig 
deeper into the caseload‘ whilst reflecting the extra costs involved. The Social 
Market Foundation advocates that providers be paid higher payments as the total 
percentage of participants entering sustained employment increases.
The proposed models are untested but address some of the key issues reviewed in 
this study. They appear to provide incentives that would result in more participants 
entering employment and avoid complex mechanisms for individual assessments 
and price enhancements for the harder to help. They balance risk and reward 
between purchaser and provider and, in the case of the target accelerator, remove 
the disincentives of capped budgets for over-performance. Notwithstanding the 
practical issues that need to be addressed, such a model merits experimental 
testing to gauge its impact on performance and costs, its potential to assist harder 
to help participants and whether it would militate against parking and creaming.
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5Whilst such models may incentivise providers to ‘dig deeper into the caseload’ 
many harder to help participants may still not be placed in jobs. There may also be 
merit in testing differential service fees and payments focused on particular hard 
to help groups, such as those with a combination of three or four easily identified 
significant barriers to employment. Such enhanced payments may encourage 
providers to undertake more intensive assessments of individuals’ problems, 
needs and underlying barriers and so work harder with those most in need. Such 
a payment system may add to administrative complexity but it would potentially 
target resources specifically at the harder to help, meet the greater costs faced by 
providers, and reward such efforts. 
More immediately it seems clear that minimising creaming and parking in the 
FND rests on a combination of policy design, including any identification and 
pricing for the most disadvantaged, and effective scrutiny and management of 
performance.
An immediate approach to the FND might be to identify and monitor the progress 
of the hardest to help. DWP should track participation and placement patterns 
for service users with characteristics that suggest they are furthest away from 
immediate employment. Such characteristics need to be carefully defined but could 
be selected from length of time on benefits, basic skill barriers, homelessness, 
criminal record, substance misuse, returners to the New Deal, or whether a person 
has been sanctioned. Jobcentre Plus already has markers in its management 
information system to identify some of these characteristics which would be still 
more accurate after an individual has been with Jobcentre Plus for as much as a 
year of unemployment. 
Tracking providers’ performance with these groups would discourage creaming 
and reinforce the message that providers must help all referrals to make progress 
towards a sustained job. This could be further supported by contract management 
and by recognition in the Star Rating system.
An equally pragmatic response to reduce parking in the system could be achieved 
through careful regulation of referral flows, so that providers and their case 
managers have more incentive to work intensively with those participants they 
already have rather than wait for more job-ready clients to arrive.
Summary
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1 Introduction
The DWP contracts with an extensive network of non-profit and for-profit providers 
for the delivery of employment programmes. Over the past ten years there has 
been significant change and the Government now has committed to a strategy of 
‘welfare market’ reform (DWP, 2008). The principles of this strategy will be applied 
first to the FND that will replace all existing New Deal and EZ provision for the 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) unemployed from 2009 (DWP, 2007).
The DWP’s Commissioning Strategy outlines its approach to contract management 
and how it will seek to ensure service quality for all participants. The strategy also 
contains a commitment to ‘trial different models of outcome payments‘ and for 
the DWP to work with its providers to ‘develop more sophisticated, differentiated 
models‘ to identify service users who may be helped quickly to return to work and 
those who need more intensive support (DWP, 2008, p. 22).
Employment programmes are designed to provide enhanced assistance to service 
users with particular barriers to entering or staying in employment. Despite the 
positive impacts of many programmes, evidence suggests that many of them, 
whether delivered by public agencies or external providers, are less effective in 
meeting the needs of the ‘hardest to help’ or the ‘hardest to serve’. This group 
typically includes the homeless, ex-offenders, people with poor basic skills or 
language barriers, those with physical or learning disabilities, mental health 
or substance or alcohol misuse issues, debt and so on. Other groups may be 
hard to help due to factors such as location, domestic violence, ethnicity and/or 
discrimination. There is no commonly accepted definition of the hardest to help 
but several British reports have highlighted the relative weakness of standardised 
‘work first’ programmes, such as the New Deals, to place such service users into 
employment (SEU, 2004; NEP, 2004; HoC WPC, 2007).
In this context, the DWP commissioned Inclusion to undertake a rapid review 
of available evidence on other countries that have used differential payments for 
the hardest to help client groups in their outcome payment systems with external 
providers.
81.1 Objectives of the review 
This study identified countries which make extensive use of job outcome 
performance-based contracting and aims to:
•	 identify	 variations	 in	 the	 use	 of	 differential	 payments	 in	 performance-based	
contracting in the delivery of employment programmes;
•	 briefly	 consider	 the	 initial	 classification	 and	 referral	 systems	 used	 to	 identify	
the hardest to help and how such measurement is linked to outcome payment 
incentives;
•	 assess	available	evidence	on	the	impact	of	such	differential	payments	and	the	
extent to which they have mitigated against ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’; and
•	 extract	 lessons	 from	 the	 review	 that	 may	 be	 used	 to	 inform	 the	 further	
development of the British approach to differential pricing.
The research design combined an evidence and literature review supplemented by 
email correspondence and telephone interviews with informed experts in relevant 
countries. Electronic databases were searched using the key words – ‘creaming’, 
‘cream-skimming’ and ‘parking’, linked with other search terms such as ‘differential 
prices’, ‘outcomes funding’, ‘output related funding’ and ‘performance-based 
funding’. The literature identified included survey, case study and evaluation 
reports produced by policy institutes, academics and Government departments. 
1.2 Structure of the report
The first section of the report reviews performance-based contracting, employment 
programmes and the issues involved in differential access to employment services. 
Subsequently, the report reviews evidence on those countries that have made most 
extensive use of performance-based contracting, with case studies of Australia, the 
Netherlands, the USA and GB. The final section considers the policy implications 
of the case study findings.
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92  Differential access to 
employment programmes
In Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries the 
Public Employment Service (PES) provides a job matching service for job seekers 
and employers and generally provides enhanced services for people who have 
greater difficulty in making the transition into employment. These core services 
are typically supplemented by a variety of employment programmes including job 
search assistance and counselling; training and education; work experience and 
job creation. 
In most countries access to employment services and programmes is differentiated 
on the basis of the specific cash benefit that people receive and the employment 
barriers of individual service users. The eligibility rules for particular services and 
programmes are designed, in part, to increase cost effectiveness by reducing 
‘deadweight’. This ensures that service users who get jobs with minimal assistance 
are not placed in more expensive provision that might also delay their entry into 
employment. Such rules also serve to target particular individuals or groups to 
ensure they are placed in appropriate assistance. Eligibility rules also are connected 
with conditionality. The relevant eligibility rules for some benefits will signal those 
service users who can voluntarily choose to participate in a programme; for other 
benefits such rules signal mandatory participation.
Simple eligibility rules have obvious advantages in terms of their ease of operation 
and equality of treatment but they are a ‘rather blunt instrument‘ and may be 
‘inefficient in terms of achieving a good match between individual client needs 
and provision of support‘ (Hasluck, 2004, p. 5). In many systems, as in the UK, front 
line advisers may be allowed to exercise a degree of discretion when interpreting 
eligibility rules and referring service users to more expensive provision. 
In other systems public agencies have more elaborate screening and profiling 
instruments to ensure individualised and effective targeting. Profiling methods 
have been used extensively in European countries, Australia and the USA to score 
and weight the barriers facing individual service users and to allocate them to 
unsupported job search, particular programmes and/or other forms of support 
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(Rudolph and Konle-Seidl, 2005). In Australia the results from such profiling also 
have been linked directly with the differential prices paid to contractors who 
deliver services in the JN.
2.1  Employment programmes and performance-based 
contracting
There are wide variations in the delivery of employment programmes and welfare 
to work services. In some countries they may be delivered by the PES itself. In 
others they are delivered through a more or less complex network of public, private 
and third sector organisations. An OECD review found that in many countries 
employment and training programmes are outsourced and it reported variations 
in purchaser identity, contract size and contract terms (OECD, 2007). 
Traditionally, the public bodies responsible for purchasing employment programmes 
have specified the detailed design of the particular intervention and the criteria by 
which participants are to be recruited. The public body also determined the price 
to be paid, the terms of the contract, and typically awarded a grant to the provider 
or paid the contractor for services delivered.
The ‘performance revolution’ that has gathered pace in a number of countries 
since the 1980s has seen the public bodies responsible for organising these 
services adopting a wider range of management techniques. These have enabled 
the purchaser to shift the focus of their relationships with external providers 
away from ‘inputs’ and processes towards securing the specific results that 
governments want. Greater emphasis was put on measuring and paying for the 
‘outputs’ and/or fees for services delivered, and, more recently, on the ‘outcomes’ 
secured. Outcomes seek to measure the impacts of service delivery which, in the 
case of employment programmes, usually refers to job entry and latterly sustained 
employment and earnings.
Such changes of emphasis have been reflected in the contracts with which the 
purchaser seeks to make their programmes more efficient and effective. Purchasers 
now are more likely to hold contractors accountable for collecting and reporting 
data on the services they deliver and to withhold payments or withdraw contracts 
from providers who do not meet service standards. In a number of countries 
performance payments have been made dependent on securing employment 
outcomes with a variable proportion of provider income related to success in 
placing and keeping participants in jobs.
In various evidence-based reviews, the OECD has highlighted ‘optimal’ conditions 
for managing such ‘quasi-markets’. It recommends a mixture of incentives and 
safeguards – ‘combining pay-for-results and the principle of selective contract 
renewal with arrangements for more rapid elimination of providers whose 
performance is exceptionally poor and regulations that enforce minimum levels of 
service provision‘ (OECD, 2005, p. 221). In a seminal review a senior economist 
Differential access to employment programmes
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involved in developing the OECD analysis stressed the importance of accurate 
performance indicators and retaining independent control of referral processes 
for reducing deadweight and minimising creaming (Grubb, 2004). The evidence 
and analysis suggested that the best outcomes that correspond with longer-
term impacts are likely to include unemployment exit, job entry rates, sustained 
employment and earnings in work.
2.2  From measuring performance to rewarding 
outcomes
The transition to performance-based contracting in employment programmes took 
place initially in the USA, following the implementation of the 1982 Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) (Steedman et al. 1993). This legislation devolved funding 
and purchasing power to a national network of Private Industry Councils (PICs) 
and linked explicit performance outcomes with financial incentives to motivate 
agency staff. Annual performance target levels were set by the Department of 
Labor and the outcomes rewarded were designed to measure the return on public 
investment. Over time these outcomes evolved to include placement in unsubsidised 
employment; retention for not less than six months in such employment; increased 
earnings; a reduction in welfare dependency; and skills acquisition – including 
basic skills and qualifications. 
An important characteristic of the JTPA funding model was that when the 
Department of Labor set state-level performance targets it provided a regression 
model that states could use to adjust targets to reflect economic conditions and 
participant characteristics in the Service Delivery Areas served by PICs1. At the 
end of each programme year the federal department calculated the performance 
measures for each delivery area, along with any bonus to which a state was entitled. 
The state could allocate the bonus as it saw fit. High performing PICs could receive 
a bonus amounting to as much as 20 or 30 per cent of its regular budget which it 
then could use with more flexibility than allowed with its mainstream funds. These 
incentive systems were reflected in the contracts and payment systems between 
PICs and sub-contractors and by the end of the 1980s, 80 per cent of PICs were 
making at least some element of payment dependent on outcomes (Felstead, 
1998). 
Within the US, performance-based contracts were extended into other programme 
areas, including ‘supported employment’ for disabled people and the welfare to 
work programmes targeted at lone parent families. They were consolidated in the 
Workforce Investment Act (1998) that replaced JTPA. 
1 The JTPA model was influenced by health care provision where purchasers 
used risk adjustment models to correct for patient characteristics before 
judging the quality or effectiveness of medical care.
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The US approach influenced other countries. In the UK TECs (England and 
Wales) and LECs (Scotland) were modelled on PICs. Introduced in 1987, these 
private sector bodies were funded through performance-based contracts with an 
increasing proportion of funding dependent on job outcomes and qualifications 
gained. The British Employment Service also introduced job outcome performance 
contracts for some of the separate provision it outsourced. 
Subsequently, Job-outcome contracts were central to the design of the new market 
based employment services systems introduced in Australia and the Netherlands 
in the late 1990s. Other countries, such as Denmark, Canada and Israel, have 
implemented equally radical market-based reforms (Gould, 2007; Lilley and 
Hartwich, 2008). Some European countries, such as Germany, France and Sweden, 
are experimenting with the introduction of job outcome performance contracts 
(Jordan, 2008).
2.3  ‘Cream-skimming’, ‘creaming’, ‘parking’ and 
differential pricing
The transition to performance-based contracts offers potential for innovation, 
flexibility and efficiency savings but the difficulties of managing complex services 
through contracts pose risks to service access, costs, quality and accountability 
(Heinrich, 2004; Heinrich and Choi, 2007). 
There are three particular risks commonly thought to be intensified by performance-
based contracts. The first is ‘cream-skimming’, where contractors who are paid 
by results select more job-ready participants. This is a particular risk where the 
group eligible for a service exceeds the number of available places and/or where 
providers choose who they admit to a service. Creaming can occur even when 
the provider is required to take designated participants. The second risk is that 
a provider may overtly or covertly concentrate their efforts on those participants 
more easily placed in employment. The third risk is ‘parking’ where more costly 
to help participants receive only minimal services and make little progress in a 
programme. If such participants secure employment through their own efforts this 
represents a ‘windfall’ gain for the provider.2 
Purchasers of employment services try to reduce creaming and parking and to 
target services at the hardest to help. Such efforts may include requiring that 
providers accept all service users referred to them, whether by front line advisers 
or by random assignment, thereby reducing the potential to cream the most job-
ready. Purchasers may also mandate providers to service all participants and then 
scrutinise the delivery of such requirements through regular contract monitoring 
and/or customer surveys. They may set specific performance standards for 
assessing employment barriers and referring those who need specialist assistance 
to appropriate support. 
2 It is important to note that these risks are shared in public sector delivery 
systems that measure and reward performance standards or targets.
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In many countries it appears that provision for the hardest to help is targeted 
through specific programmes that have different prices, funding arrangements 
and performance standards during which participants are prepared for work and/
or entry to work first provision. There is evidence, though, that some purchasers 
also use differential pricing to provide an enhanced payment to a provider as a 
necessary incentive to work with more disadvantaged participants. Such differential 
prices are commonly calibrated with the characteristics of disadvantaged service 
users. In the Netherlands, for example, purchasers have targeted performance-
based contracts at particular groups and the price agreed reflects the distance 
from the labour market of the individuals involved. Only in Australia was there 
evidence of a more complex pricing structure that sought to incentivise work with 
the hardest to help through differential pricing.
Differential access to employment programmes
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3  The Australian Job 
Network and differential 
pricing
The Australian JN was created in 1998. It is a managed quasi-market providing 
scope for competition, some degree of choice for job seekers, flexibility in the way 
services are delivered and financial rewards for successful providers. Prices have 
been determined through the tender and contracting process but are now set at 
fixed rates by the purchasing agency. 
Currently, the JN is comprised of a core of 99 ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ providers 
delivering a full range of services. These are supplemented by a wider network 
of licensed Job Placement Organisations which provide vacancy finding and job 
matching services. Nearly all Federal employment services are outsourced and 
regulated through JN-type tendering and performance arrangements with an 
estimated overall value of A$2.1 billion for 2008/09. 
The JN has experienced three distinct periods marked by different ‘Employment 
Service Contracts’ and is about to undergo further reform in a contracting regime 
to be introduced for 2009-2012. 
The design of the JN has changed as policy makers adapted the model to secure 
greater efficiencies and redefined its services to enable providers to ‘activate’ more 
working-age benefit claimants. Many of the reforms have been implemented to 
deal with unanticipated effects, notably in response to criticisms about creaming 
job-ready claimants and parking the most disadvantaged.
The Australian Job Network and differential pricing
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3.1 Job Network Services and Star Ratings 
The JN delivers a job placement and matching service and more intensive services 
for the longer-term unemployed. Most JN funding is allocated to intensive 
services. In most locations the federal Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEWR)3 ensures the presence of several agencies to induce competition 
and provide choice for job seekers. 
In the first two contracting periods, employment assistance consisted of short 
‘Job Search Training’ courses for people usually unemployed for six months, and 
‘Intensive Assistance’ (IA) for those out of work for more than a year or identified 
as being at risk of long-term unemployment. Those referred to IA were eligible for 
assistance for 12 or 15 months, depending on their degree of disadvantage. 
The first contracts (1998-2000) were based on fixed prices for more intensive services 
and a bid price for job matching services. JN providers received a combination 
of ‘up front’ fee payments and job outcome payments after 13 weeks (interim) 
and 26 weeks (final). In the second contracts (2000-2003) price competition was 
extended to the more intensive services subject to a minimum ‘floor’ price set 
by the Department. Bids were assessed on quality as well as price but providers 
typically submitted bids close to the pre-determined ‘floor’ price (PC, 2002). 
JN services were reshaped in 2003 to provide an ‘Active Participation Model’ 
(APM), designed to deliver a ‘service continuum’. Job seekers since have been 
required to register with one JN provider contracted to deliver initial registration, 
job placement and matching. The ‘continuum’ combined regular review interviews 
with periods of assistance, punctuated by periods when unemployed job seekers 
had to undertake part time mutual obligation activities, typically in the form of 
‘Work for the Dole’. The intensity of JN interventions increased with duration of 
unemployment. 
The most expensive provision – ‘Intensive Support Customised Assistance’ (ISca) 
– is mandatory after a year of unemployment or earlier if the person is ‘highly 
disadvantaged’. Unlike the previous IA phase, ISca requires fortnightly contact 
with a case manager who develops and monitors a back-to-work plan. To inject 
more intensity the JN provider must involve the participant in at least three days a 
week of structured activity for three months, with total ISca participation limited 
to six months. 
3 For consistency this report refers to DEWR although the name of the 
Department has varied and in 2007 was further amended to the Department 
for Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR).
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The APM introduced other changes, including a Job Seeker Account (JSKA). The 
Account comprised a restricted pool of funds earmarked for spending only on 
employment barrier reduction. The highest amount is triggered for those entering 
ISca. The Account is not an individual entitlement and a provider can use the 
account flexibly across their caseload. They are not allowed, however, to retain 
any surplus as profit. Although providers may spend the funds on a wide range of 
activities all expenditure must be classified and reported (ANAO, 2007, p. 18). 
Performance is also driven through a ‘Star Ratings’ system that has been revised in 
response to provider feedback and to reflect changing policy priorities, such as the 
increased involvement of job seekers with disabilities or childcare responsibilities. 
The original aim of the Star Ratings was to inform participant (and employer) choice 
but the system has proved more effective in driving provider performance (PC, 2002; 
ANAO, 2005b). The Star Ratings methodology includes regression adjustments for 
labour market conditions and participant characteristics allowing a more rigorous 
comparison of provider performance. The regression formula gives most value to 
full time employment outcomes sustained for 13 weeks or more secured as soon 
as possible after service users enter assistance. The speed of placement weighting 
was introduced in 2006 to reduce parking and to serve as a counterweight to a 
fees system that gives relatively little incentive to providers to place people until 
they are 12 months unemployed (Lam, 2007, p. 23). There is some adjustment of 
Star Rating scores to reward placement of the most disadvantaged, such as, long 
term unemployed and indigenous Australians, and there is now an adjustment to 
capture the length of time a person is continuously registered with a provider.
Star Rating performance is critical as high performance may increase business and 
secure future contracts whereas under-performance can result in loss of business 
and contract.
3.2  Job Network differential prices and the Jobseeker 
Classification Screening Instrument
The fees paid to a JN provider increase in relation to the intensity of service provided 
and risk involved in placing the job seeker in work (see Table 3.1). Outcome fees 
are significantly higher for those entering intensive support for a second time.
Early entry to the more expensive intensive provision for the ‘hardest to help’ 
is determined through the use of a profiling instrument. On making an initial 
benefit claim the individual is assessed at Centrelink, a public sector agency 
responsible for determining eligibility and making benefit payments. Front line 
staff use a computer-based diagnostic tool, the ‘Jobseeker Classification Screening 
Instrument’ (JSCI). It consists of 30 questions (reduced from 60 in 2003) intended 
to be quickly answered about age, education, disability, language skills, and so 
on. The responses are used to identify the level of disadvantage and likelihood of 
long-term unemployment. 
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Job seekers classified as ‘highly disadvantaged’ are eligible for immediate access 
to ISca and the provider is able to draw down a higher payment from the JSKA. 
There is also access to a location disadvantage supplement for job seekers in 
remote areas. Job seekers may choose from a range of specialist providers, where 
available, who have expertise in delivering services to particular groups such as 
those whose first language is not English; indigenous Australians; young people 
and mature age job seekers. In the first two contracting periods specialist JN 
providers were likely to get higher prices, reflecting their additional costs (PC, 
2002, p. 9.29).
The JSCI produces a measure of relative disadvantage. It is the Department that 
determines the proportion of job seekers who qualify as highly disadvantaged. 
The proportion of highly disadvantaged job seekers fell from as much as 33 per 
cent in the early phase of the JN to ten per cent by 2007 (NESA, 2008, p. 25). Over 
the same period, however, the proportion of the JN caseload receiving income 
support for more than five years increased from 10 to 25 per cent (DEEWR, 2008, 
p. 4). This change reduced the resources available to JN providers even though 
they had to work with a harder to help client group.
Another issue concerns the initial assessment of relative disadvantage – which 
now might be undertaken through a call centre – where a minority of users fail 
to reveal factors that would affect their classification. These often come to light 
after the person has registered with a provider. In the early phase of the JN this 
led to many re-referrals to Centrelink, for which providers were originally charged, 
but subsequently, JN providers were allowed to enter new data on participants 
to revise their JSCI score. This not only increased the support available for the 
individual but meant the provider would be paid a higher fee for a job outcome 
and it would improve the provider’s relative performance. This flexibility had 
unintended consequences when it was found that some providers inappropriately 
reclassified their participants. In 2007 several providers had to make repayments, 
amounting in the case of one provider to A$9 million. 
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Table 3.1  Active Participation Model: service and placement fees, 
2003-2006*
Duration of 
unemployment
 
Service provided
 
Service fees
 
Placement fees
0-3 months Job Search Support A$60 
Registration
A$165 – A$275
3-6 months Intensive Support
Job Search Training
or 
Intensive Support
Job Search Training
Refresher
A$660 for JST  
(3 weeks)
A$220 for JSTR
(1 week)
A$275 + A$550 
interim if still 
employed after 13 
weeks (applies after 4 
months)
6-12 months Intensive Support 
Mutual Obligation
or
Work for the Dole
A$90 for Review 
Interviews (7 months)
12-18 months Intensive Support 
Customised 
Assistance Period 1
A$800 on starting CA A$385  
+ A$1650 interim  
+ A$825 final
(26 weeks)
18-24 months Intensive Support
Mutual Obligation
or
Work for the Dole
A$70 for Review
Interviews
18-24 months Intensive Support
Mutual Obligation
or
Work for the Dole
A$70 for Review
Interviews
24-30 months Intensive Support
Customised
Assistance Period 2
A$475 on
starting 2nd CA
A$385
+ A$3300 interim
+ A$1650 final
After 36 months Periodic Contact 
A$100 for
Review
Interviews
A$385
+ A$4400 interim
+ A$2200 final
*  There were marginal changes to service fees but not outcome payments for the 2006-2009 
contract.
Source: McNally, 2003, p. 8.
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3.3 The Personal Support Programme
Job seekers with special needs (such as mental health issues) that cannot be met by 
the JN, may, following assessment through the JSCI, be referred for a ‘Job Capacity 
Assessment’. This assessment is used also to determine eligibility for the separate 
‘Disability Support Pension’. Job seekers whose circumstances prevent them from 
working until certain barriers are addressed may be referred by the assessor to a 
range of smaller specialist programmes including specialist provision for young 
people, for those with disabilities, or to the Personal Support Programme (PSP). 
Once a person has commenced in the JN they also may be referred by the provider 
to other relevant and available programmes financed by state governments, but 
they still have to demonstrate active job search.
The PSP is targeted at the most disadvantaged job seekers. It is a flexible provision 
that provides individualised case management for up to two years when service 
providers help participants work towards economic or social outcomes. Economic 
outcomes include transferring to work, employment assistance programmes and 
study or vocational training. Social outcomes include stabilised circumstances, 
increased community engagement, stable accommodation and improved life 
skills. During their participation job seekers are exempted from job search activity 
testing.
Most PSP providers are non-profit organisations. Their contracts are outcome-
focused but include also significant payments for commencements and milestones 
achieved during participation (see Table 3.2). These contracts were, in part, 
modelled on the US milestone and outcome payments system for supported 
employment programmes (discussed later). 
Table 3.2  Personal Support Programme: Milestone and outcome 
payments 
Payment Amount
Commencement Payment A$660.00
Action Plan Payment A$660.00
Milestone Payment A$660.00
Interim Economic Outcome Payment A$1100.00
Final Economic Outcome Payment A$440.00
Post-Outcome Support Payment Variable
Completion Payment A$220.00
Social Outcome Payment A$825.00
Remote Loading A$550.00
Remote Service Annual Block Payment Variable
Remote Loading Special A$550.00
Interpreter Assistance Loading A$660.00
Reconnection Payment A$165.00
Exit Payment A$165.00
Recommencement Payment A$660.00
Source: DEWR, 2005, Part C, Schedule C4.
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3.4 Creaming and parking in the Job Network
Evaluations of the JN indicate that it has been more cost effective than earlier 
arrangements, has achieved higher ‘net impacts’ and has created strong incentives 
for providers to secure job outcomes (OECD, 2001; PC, 2002; DEWR, 2006). As 
with programmes in other countries, however, evaluations also report that job 
placement rates for more disadvantaged job seekers are lower, reflecting both 
their individual and labour market barriers. There have been particular problems 
with creaming and parking. 
In the first two contract periods, when providers had greatest flexibility in 
delivering IA, it was found that most employment assistance was given in the 
first few months of participation and that a large number of service users had 
little subsequent contact with their providers. Critics suggested that the impact 
of differential pricing was offset by other funding incentives which encouraged 
providers to take the up-front service fees, work with the most job-ready, and park 
the hardest to help (Considine, 2005).
The introduction of the APM was designed to ensure more regular contact between 
providers and their participants. It has been suggested, however, that the other 
performance incentives, especially the Star Ratings, continued to shape provider 
behaviour in ways that disadvantaged the hardest to help and the providers who 
worked with them (Murray, 2006). Commentators have been critical of service 
quality, pointing out that low cost job search assistance and motivational strategies 
are unlikely to reduce the employment barriers of the hardest to help and that JN 
providers make little use of more costly employment subsidies or training provision 
needed to tackle the barriers of the most disadvantaged (ACOSS, 2008).
3.5   ‘A Fresh Approach’: The new Australian 
Employment Services model
The present Australian Government, elected in November 2007, accepts that the 
existing JN model is complex and ‘rigid’ and that existing incentives ‘skew’ provider 
behaviour towards short-term jobs. Consequently, it has announced major reform 
proposals to resolve these issues and meet new objectives. 
The new Employment Pathways system will replace both the JN and other specialist 
provision, such as PSP, with a unified service delivery model (DEEWR, 2008).
Centrelink staff will use a revised JSCI to categorise service users into one of four 
‘streams’, with the most job ready referred to stream 1 and those with ‘severe 
barriers’ referred to stream 4. Each service user will develop an Employment 
Pathway Plan with their provider and a more flexible Employment Pathway Fund 
will replace the JSKA. The level of resources for each participant, and outcome 
incentive for providers, will increase in relation to duration of unemployment and 
the severity of the barriers indicated by the JSCI and the stream to which they 
are referred (see Table 3.3). On completion of a stream, usually after 12 months, 
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the user may be reassessed and moved to another stream, or more commonly be 
required to participate in work experience activity. 
Skills assessments and referral to training programmes are a new element of the 
proposed provision. The completion of referred accredited training will result in a 
20 per cent bonus to the JN provider concerned if the participants are subsequently 
placed into employment in a related area.
Under the new model all service, job placement and outcome fees are fixed and 
not subject to price competition (DEEWR, 2008, p. 8).
Table 3.3 Australian Employment Services: 2009-2012
Work Ready Disadvantaged job seekers
STREAM 1 STREAM 2 STREAM 3 STREAM 4
5% of new job 
seekers
•		A$11	in	
Employment 
Pathway Fund
•		£385-A$440	in	Job	
Placement fees
•		Up	to	A$781	in	
service fees 
22% of new job 
seekers
•		A$550	in	
Employment 
Pathway Fund
•		£385-A$2800	in	
Outcome and Job 
Placement fees
•		Up	to	A$885	in	
service fees 
10% of new job 
seekers
•		A$1100	in	
Employment 
Pathway Fund
•		£385-A$6600	in	
Outcome and Job 
Placement fees
•		Up	to	A$1120	in	
service fees 
15% of new job 
seekers
•		A$1650	in	
Employment 
Pathway Fund
•		£385-A$6600	in	
Outcome and Job 
Placement fees
•		Up	to	A$2736	in	
service fees
Work experience including Work for the Dole
•	A$330	work	experience	service	fee
•	A$500	in	the	Employment	Pathway	Fund
•	Up	to	A$392	in	service	fees	per	year
Source: DEEWR, 2008, p. 3.
3.6 Conclusion
The creation of the JN illustrates strengths and weaknesses in using market 
mechanisms to deliver employment services. DEWR created a viable delivery 
network and competition between providers and the outcome-related funding 
system stimulated some innovation and focused providers and their case managers 
on entry into sustained employment rather than on inputs and programme 
commencements. The JN was mired, however, in controversies about creaming 
and parking, about some providers playing the system and about increased 
rates of sanctions as some job seekers failed to negotiate complex attendance, 
participation and reporting requirements.
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Several features of the Australian model have been designed to reduce creaming 
and parking, and these have evolved as evaluation and provider feedback have 
identified problems. A detailed review of the Australian system suggests that the use 
of evidence-based profiling and differential pricing created ‘incentives to provide 
truly intensive assistance to particular disadvantaged jobseekers‘ even if this was 
not immediately apparent (PC, 2002). The system was also supplemented by other 
interventions to ensure more equitable service delivery. The key supplementary 
features that have characterised the Australian system include:
•	 recalibrating	provider	fees	so	that	a	greater	proportion	of	funding	is	ring-fenced	
for service delivery and case manager contacts, with the JSKA or proposed 
Employment Pathways Fund used to quarantine a proportion of spending that 
may be used only to directly reduce individual employment barriers;
•	 the	creation	of	separate	programmes	or	funding	streams	with	specialist	providers,	
such as the PSP, for the most disadvantaged for whom work first provision is 
likely to be ineffective, at least initially. Such programmes have used an outcome 
payment system, but one that rewards process milestones and both economic 
and social outcomes;
•	 the	use	of	a	‘quality’	key	performance	indicator	that	enables	the	purchaser	to	
scrutinise activity levels with individual participants, especially the very long-
term unemployed, and to intervene through contract management and reviews 
where parking is observed; and
•	 loading	performance	measures,	such	as	the	Star	Ratings,	towards	outcomes	for	
the most disadvantaged.
The Australian system is entering a new phase and testing new approaches to its 
outcome payment and performance management systems which seek both to 
retain the focus on employment and to integrate this with the Government’s other 
skill development and social inclusion objectives. After implementation, these new 
approaches will merit further scrutiny to inform British policy development.
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4  The Dutch Reintegration 
Market and differential 
pricing
The Dutch welfare system has changed radically and now has three distinct markets 
for its ‘reintegration services’. These markets reflect the role and responsibilities of 
different purchasers and the systems of income support for working-age people.
The Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV) is responsible for the social 
insurance system which covers most people in regular employment. The UWV is 
responsible for paying relatively generous wage-related benefits to people who 
cannot work either because they are unemployed or they have a long-term health 
problem or disability. It is also liable for purchasing reintegration services for those 
with greater employment barriers.
The Work and Income Employment Capacity Act (2006) reshaped the role of the 
UWV. Employers must now pay the wages of any sick or disabled employees 
for two years and have to reintegrate such employees within their company or 
in other employment. One aim of the legislation was to stimulate a separate 
private market for rehabilitation, occupational health and reintegration services, 
purchased directly by employers or the private insurance companies with whom 
they insure such risks. 
Municipalities, or local government, act as purchasers in a third market where 
they procure reintegration services and employment programmes for social 
assistance recipients for whom they are responsible. There are 443 municipalities. 
In 2004 the mechanisms by which they were funded by central Government were 
fundamentally changed – giving municipalities a powerful incentive to reduce the 
number of people claiming social assistance. Many have done so through the 
introduction of work first programmes (van Geuns and van Gent, 2007).
In 2001 legislation required the UWV to contract out the delivery of most of its 
reintegration services to private providers. Municipalities also had to contract out 
up to 70 per cent of their reintegration services, although this requirement has 
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since been abandoned. Municipalities enjoyed considerable freedom in designing 
their procurement strategies and, whilst influenced by UWV developments, 
followed no common framework for contracting out services (Vink, 2003).
The following section considers the experience of the UWV which is the largest 
sole purchaser in the Dutch market. It reviews the ways in which the UWV has 
sought to shape its contract incentives to both secure cost effectiveness and that 
services are targeted at those hardest to help. Recently, the nature of the UWV 
market has changed markedly. The system of formal tenders and specific delivery 
contracts was fragmented following the introduction of ‘Individual Reintegration 
Agreements’ (IROs), that permitted users much more choice in negotiating 
their own support with service providers. This led to the introduction of a new 
‘purchasing framework’ in 2008.
4.1 Profiling and reintegration services 
In the Netherlands, workless people must first register for benefits at a ‘Centre for 
Work Income (CWI)’.4 CWI advisers undertake a formal assessment of an individual 
before they can submit a claim for benefit. Initially the assessment included use 
of a profiling instrument, the ‘Kansmeter’, which allocated service users into four 
phases, with phase 1 indicating those thought capable of getting a job without 
intensive assistance and phase 4 denoting those viewed as unable to enter 
employment within a year. Phase 1 clients were serviced by the CWI with those on 
phases 2-4 referred to case managers in either the UWV or the municipality who 
assigned them to more or less intensive reintegration services. 
‘Reintegration’ services encompass case management, assessment, rehabilitation, 
vocational and/or job search training, mandatory work experience, extended work 
trials, and job placement and retention services. In the market, the service packages 
are often organised and purchased as ‘trajectories’. When a municipality or agency 
purchases what is called a full ‘reintegration trajectory’, this includes contracting 
out the case management service. Alternatively, in-house case managers in the 
UWV or municipalities refer service users to shorter service components procured 
through ‘modular purchasing’. 
The ‘Kansmeter’ profiling system was abandoned following criticisms that it led to 
inappropriate referrals and parking. Initially, up to 70 per cent of phases 2-4 clients 
were classified as phase 4 and this was taken as a signal by UWV and municipal 
case managers to provide no services. The instrument was criticised for its poor 
predictive powers, often caused by key factors not being identified at the CWI 
assessment, with the purchasing agencies and their providers often compelled to 
undertake their own subsequent assessments. Later evaluations reported that 18 
per cent of those classified as phase 4 actually found work unaided or with the 
4 The network of CWIs has been delivered by a separate agency but in January 
2009 it will be merged into, and thereafter operate as a division of, the 
UWV.
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help of an employment agency within a year. By 2007 the Kansmeter had been 
replaced by a simpler two phase system based on the capacity for independent job 
search. Those users categorised as ‘A’ were ‘immediately employable’, and those 
classified as ‘B’ were in ‘need of further preparation for work’ and referral to UWV 
or the municipality. This was designed to avoid immediate categorisation and give 
more flexibility to a CWI adviser to reassess a user if they encountered barriers in 
their search for work.
4.2 The UWV reintegration market
The UWV has led the development of the reintegration market. During the late 
1990s social insurance agencies began to contract with private providers but the 
first significant tender was issued in 2000. Subsequently, the UWV organised 
some 16 ‘tender rounds’ between 2002 and 2008 with the annual number of 
trajectories involved falling from the 60,000 purchased in each of the first two 
years to some 40,000 by 2006. 
Each tender invited providers to submit bids to deliver batches of trajectories and 
services targeted at particular client groups, sectors and regions. At one point 
this involved some 48 separate categories of participants. By linking the tendered 
price to the degree of difficulty of the targeted group the UWV sought to limit any 
potential for creaming.
The UWV continuously adapted the way in which it designed tenders and managed 
contracts. The initial tenders, for example, incurred high transaction costs5 for 
both the UWV and providers, and problems were experienced in producing and 
assessing high numbers of submitted tenders in short periods (Sol, 2003, p. 212). 
Subsequent changes sought to reduce administrative burdens, create more stability 
and increase the emphasis on ‘pay-for-performance’.
Throughout the period there were some common elements in how tenders were 
awarded and delivered. When bidding for a contract a provider had to indicate 
the average costs for a trajectory and the proportion of participants they would 
place into sustained employment, with minimum job placement rates specified 
by the purchaser. The bidder was expected to make their own judgements about 
the costs of trajectories and the performance levels they would attain and the 
purchaser could then decide which bid they would choose.
Contracts were typically awarded for one year until 2004 when the UWV awarded 
two-year contracts for some target groups and introduced the possibility of 
contract extensions for high performing providers. These changes covered about 
a third of the trajectories put out to tender. 
5 Transaction costs are the administrative costs incurred by purchasing 
organisations and providers throughout the procurement process, for 
example, the costs of developing a service specification as part of an invitation 
to tender.
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A UWV contract did not guarantee a minimum number of referrals for a provider. 
Actual recruitment depended on the discretion of the UWV case manager and, 
to some extent, the choice of the service user. This process was itself thought 
to act as a safeguard against ‘creaming’. In certain circumstances, the provider 
could refer the service user back to the UWV if the individual had been wrongly 
assessed or was judged unsuitable, but it was rare for a provider to refuse to enrol 
a participant (Struyven and Steurs, 2005). 
Once the contract commenced the provider could recruit a participant for up 
to a year and delivery of a complete trajectory could take up to two years. One 
consequence was that overall job placement results from particular contracts 
would not be known for up to three years from the point of commencement. 
The primary aim of UWV contracts was to reward providers for placing participants 
in sustained employment. In the first phase of contracts the key principle was that 
of ‘no cure, less pay’ which meant that the provider would not recover the full 
price of the trajectory they had given in their bid unless they placed someone 
into a sustained employment outcome. A job entry fee was usually paid after 
two months in employment where the participant had a minimum six-month job 
contract and the payment could be higher for a longer employment contract 
(Struyven and Steurs, 2005). 
Other contract clauses were designed to provide incentives that encouraged 
providers to exceed the job entry rates they committed to, and to do so quickly. 
These incentives varied in line with the barriers faced by particular client groups. 
After 2003 greater emphasis was placed on ‘payment by results’ with the 
introduction of ‘no cure, no pay’ contracts for the relatively easier to place. In 
2004 this applied to about 40 per cent of the trajectories contracted for. The 
other trajectories continued to pay for services delivered and outcomes secured. 
Between 10 and 20 per cent of the price was paid on completion of an action 
plan, a fixed payment of about 40 per cent six months after commencement 
and another 40 or 50 per cent after placement in a job for two months, with a 
minimum six-month contract (Sol, 2008, p. 77).
The UWV emphasis on price competition ensured a reduction in the average cost 
per contracted trajectory that had fallen to between €2,800 and €3,500 by 2007. 
Providers and others argued that the fall in prices and focus on short-term results 
to secure outcome payments had a negative impact on the quality of trajectories 
as providers removed costly service elements, especially longer-term training (De 
Koning, 2007). In response to Parliamentary pressure, the Government and UWV 
reintroduced an additional training budget in 2004.
UWV contracts have been designed to promote competition and reduce potential 
barriers to entry for new providers, and portions of the budget in several tenders 
have been reserved for local providers, new entrants, or innovative projects. 
Nevertheless by 2004 it was argued that provision was dominated by larger 
providers delivering standardised services and few new entrants were bidding 
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in response to tenders (Morrell and Branosky, 2005). Providers maintained that 
service quality was good although it had been weakened by lower prices.
4.3 Individual Reintegration Agreements (IROs) 
The legislation that created the reintegration market required that services should 
be tailored to the users’ needs and that participants should have ‘freedom of 
choice’, subject to the objective of moving into employment (SZW, 2003). In 
particular, there was provision that users should be actively engaged in the analysis 
of the barriers they faced and that their opinion should be sought on important 
issues, such as the selection of a reintegration agency. 
In response to criticism about the standardisation of reintegration services and 
the lack of choice available, the UWV introduced IROs from January 2004. These 
allowed eligible service users to negotiate an individual plan with a provider of 
their choice, subject to agreement with the UWV who subsequently entered into 
a contract with the provider. 
An IRO trajectory can last for up to two years and the normal maximum price is 
€5,000. For users with more significant barriers the price may be up to €7,500 
and, in exceptional circumstances, the UWV may increase this limit still further. The 
contract offers a no cure, less pay funding formula and the provider is paid 20 per 
cent at the start of an agreed plan, 30 per cent after six months’ participation with 
50 per cent of the agreed fee payable for sustained employment. This formula may 
be varied with higher service fees for those most difficult to place. Although the 
total amounts are maximal prices, the average reported price per IRO trajectory in 
2007 was €4,500. Only half this cost is incurred should the participant fail to get 
employment.6 
The individual budget was more popular than expected and within months more 
users were opting for IROs than were participating in tendered trajectories. The IRO 
led also to an influx of much smaller providers, and the number of companies with 
whom the UWV contracted increased rapidly from less than 100 in 2003 to 1,960 
by late 20077. About 1,700 of these delivered IROs only and some 1,500 were 
‘one person-providers’ who might only serve between 10 and 15 participants. The 
6 There have been no rigorous evaluations of the net impacts or costs of IROs. 
Anecdotal reports refer to the positive effects that IROs have on the motivation 
and engagement of users who themselves report higher levels of satisfaction 
with the services received. One evaluation of raw outcome results and costs 
found that whilst IROs cost more per trajectory, job outcomes are higher. In 
terms of crude cost per placement, IROs were more cost effective for those 
claiming disability benefits and marginally more expensive for those claiming 
unemployment benefit (Sol, 2008, Table 3.2).
7 Estimates provided by Boaborea, the association of Netherlands providers, to 
the author in August 2008.
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provider registration requirements were minimal and there was concern about the 
quality of provision. The rapid increase in IROs also undermined the tender system. 
Larger providers who had incurred the costs of securing tenders saw recruitment 
fall and began to re-engineer their processes to deliver IROs. 
These developments led to a major overhaul of the UWV contracting system with 
the introduction in April 2008 of a new ‘purchase framework’ (Sol, 2008).
4.4  The Netherlands ‘purchase framework’, pricing and 
the reintegration coach
The new ‘purchase framework’ requires that all providers have to meet specified 
process and performance requirements to be placed on a UWV ‘approved list’, 
implicitly removing many of the small operators currently delivering IROs. The 
UWV selects between 150 and 200 providers in each region whose bids offer 
to provide either complete trajectories, in the form of IROs, or to provide all or 
some of six specified services (see Table 4.1). The UWV specifies maximum prices 
for each of these services whilst the provider determines the level at which they 
charge their fees – which is one of the criteria used by the UWV in compiling the 
approved list.
All the services except job search and placement are funded on cost reimbursement 
with no job outcome payment element. The job placement service, by contrast, 
is completely dependent on outcomes, with additional bonuses for the speed of 
placement, for a longer-term job outcome, and for placement in a job whose 
wage removes any continuing benefit entitlement.
Table 4.1  Service durations and fees in the UWV reintegration 
market
Service Duration Maximum Fee
Assessment of physical barriers 4 weeks €1,000
Strengthening physical capacities 14 weeks €2,500
Assessment of mental health barriers 4 weeks €1,500
Strengthening mental health capacities 14 weeks €3,250
Orientation to the labour market 10 weeks €1,750
Job search and placement 22 weeks €2,500 for six month job contract
Bonuses  
€1,250 if placed within 16 weeks 
€1,000 for twelve month contract 
€500 for ‘off benefit’
Source: Provided by Boaborea, the association of Netherlands providers, to the author in  
August 2008.
Within the new system, the UWV case manager, or ‘reintegration coach’ has a 
pivotal role. They provide an individualised service for each service user. The coach 
uses a diagnostic model, such as the ‘ankermodel’, which assesses the ‘chances and 
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risks’ of the individual. Such models include statistical tests on compliance, labour 
market and reintegration possibilities and duration on benefit, supplemented, 
where necessary, by other motivation and competence tests. The results are used 
by the coach to inform their professional judgement on the in-house and external 
services required and on an action plan agreed with the individual. The primary 
group for more intensive services are those who the coach judges may be placed 
in a regular job within a year or within two years for younger people on disability 
benefits. Many of the less disadvantaged unemployed will not have access to an 
IRO but the coach is likely to negotiate such trajectories with those on disability 
benefits or those with more complex barriers. For those who are furthest from the 
labour market the coach may consider another social activation option, known as 
‘societal participation’.8 
4.5 Conclusion
The Dutch reintegration market has undergone successive adaptations as the 
UWV has sought to improve the efficiency of its contracted provision, personalise 
support and target intensive services at harder to help participants. The evolution 
of the tendering system saw the development of relatively small contracts designed 
to tackle the barriers of particular groups with prices and outcome payment terms 
differentiated according to assessed distance from the labour market. Tender 
selection criteria varied according to the needs of particular groups, with much 
greater stress on the professional competence of contractors, rather than price, 
for those selected to work with more disadvantaged groups.
The other safeguard against creaming and parking rested with UWV case managers 
who monitor participant progress against their action plans. How well this has 
worked in practice has been controversial. Under the new system case managers 
have acquired a more central role and it is not yet clear how they will exercise 
the new forms of discretion involved. There already is some evidence that their 
caseloads are higher than planned and that available budgets are limited – factors 
which are themselves linked to parking and creaming within public systems.
One final development relevant to differential pricing is emerging in the private 
market created by the disability legislation. It appears that some employers/
insurers and providers use ‘progressive pricing’ models. Under these contracts the 
provider is paid a certain outcome fee for placing the first 40 per cent of a cohort 
of service users referred to them. The outcome fee is then ratcheted higher for 
fixed proportions of the cohort placed over and above that first level, incentivising 
the provider to invest greater effort in those who might be more difficult to 
place. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence yet available but this development 
may warrant more detailed scrutiny as DWP develops its approach to differential 
pricing.
8 Details provided in email correspondence with Dr. Els Sol, University of 
Amsterdam, August 2008.
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5  US welfare to work 
services, employment 
programmes and 
differential pricing
The US has been at the forefront of performance-based contracting, welfare reform 
and outsourcing the delivery of employment and welfare to work programmes. 
Most US federal and state programmes use explicit measurable performance 
standards and include both positive and negative incentives to drive service delivery. 
The focus of many performance measures may be on service inputs, activities and 
outputs but the last decade has seen a ‘dramatic shift towards outcomes as the 
dimension that really matters‘ (Smith and Grinker, 2003, p.9).
The transition to performance-based contracting has shaped the way in which 
US employment and training programmes are funded and outsourced to external 
providers. There are multiple variations in performance standards and employment 
and training contracts used throughout the states (Martin, 2005). The contract 
models most relevant to the current British interest in differential pricing include 
those that ‘pay-for-performance’, where providers are paid most for achieving 
employment-related outcomes, and ‘milestone’ contracts, where providers are paid 
for a sequence of achievements and outcomes, including job entry and retention. 
Pure pay-for-performance contracts transfer most risk from the purchaser to the 
provider. Milestone approaches involve a more moderate risk for the provider in the 
event of performance failure. In practice many contracts are hybrids that balance 
performance incentives, provider viability and payment for service inputs.
The following sections consider available information on two such contracting 
systems – the pay-for-performance contracts used in New York City for the delivery 
of welfare to work programmes and the milestone payment system used in 
Oklahoma to deliver supported employment services for ‘developmentally disabled 
individuals’. Both contracting systems have been emulated in other US states, 
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with the Oklahoma model influencing the development of similar programmes 
in the UK and Australia (Corden and Thornton, 2003; DEEWR, 2007). Another 
section considers findings from the extensive literature on employment and 
training programmes delivered through JTPA and Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
Whilst there is little direct evidence on the use of differential pricing, there are 
significant evidence-based findings on creaming and on the type of employment 
outcome indicator most closely associated with positive net impacts for the most 
disadvantaged. 
5.1  Performance standards and welfare to work services
There has been no recent comprehensive review of the contracting out of welfare 
to work services in the USA, but there is evidence that the process accelerated 
after the passage of welfare reform legislation in 1996 (Finn, 2007). Nearly all 
states contract out some of their welfare to work services with several contracting 
out the delivery both of case management services and employment programmes. 
Typical outcome measures include employment, job retention, wages or earnings, 
and participation in work activities. Process standards measure, for example, the 
number of programme enrolments, completion of assessments and accuracy of 
referrals. 
One detailed study of welfare to work contracting revealed no specific evidence 
on the use of differential payments but there was concern that the focus on 
performance standards might create perverse incentives such as creaming and 
parking. There was, however, ‘no evidence that they were a serious problem at 
the time of the site visits‘ (McConnell et al. 2003, p. 42). Providers pointed out, 
for example, that it was difficult to favour participants who were more likely to 
become employed, because they could not identify those people easily, and most 
of their participants faced employment barriers. Moreover, by including both 
outcome and process measures the contracts involved were designed to mitigate 
such perverse incentives. For example, the inclusion of measures related to job 
retention, wages and benefits, and earnings gains diminished the incentive to 
place participants quickly into poor quality jobs. Programme enrolment measures 
increased the providers’ incentive to engage all service users referred to them. 
Measures indicating completion of assessments and activities also limited the 
ability of providers to service participants differently. The challenge was to balance 
such process measures in ways that kept the provider focused on transitions into 
employment and allowed them to innovate.
As US welfare caseloads have fallen there has been increased attention on the 
problems of the ‘hard to help’ or ‘hard to engage’ groups who now comprise a 
large proportion of those targeted through welfare to work programmes. There 
is an extensive evidence base on what works with such groups and on the design 
features of particular interventions (Brown, 2001). There is, however, little available 
evidence on the use of differential pricing.
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5.2 Pay-for-performance contracts in New York City 
New York City (NYC) is a useful comparator because it has few process measures, 
has made extensive use of pay-for-performance contracts and lets some of the 
largest value welfare to work contracts in the USA. This partly reflects its use of 
prime contractors, who are awarded three-year contracts, and the fact that the 
city has the largest welfare caseload in the USA. This is both because of the size 
and complexity of the local population and because the city continues to support 
lone parents and others who exhaust their time-limited entitlement to the federally 
funded Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
In New York there are parallel systems for delivering employment and training 
programmes in the city. The Human Resource Administration (HRA) is responsible 
for delivering ’public assistance’ cash payments and referring all eligible applicants 
to mandatory employment programmes via its network of local Job Centers. WIA 
employment and training funds are distributed through a network of Workforce 
1 Centers, run by the Department of Small Business. In 2007 these workforce 
centres provided services to some 80,000 residents, some of whom would have 
been involved in HRA provision.
HRA Job Center staff assess benefit eligibility and employability and all job-ready 
applicants are referred to a jobsearch provider before a benefit claim is processed. 
The proportion of applicants deemed not ready for full engagement with work 
activities increased as the welfare caseload fell. By February 2007 the caseload 
had fallen to just under 370,000, down from over 1.1 million in 1995. Over 55 
per cent of the caseload was assessed as partially or completely unable to work 
(Kasdan and Youdelman, 2007, p. 7).
Since 2000 welfare to work employment services have been contracted out 
and delivered through a network of prime contractors (Savas, 2005). Until 2006 
separate prime contractors delivered either Skills Assessment and Job Placement 
(SAP) or Employment Services and Placement (ESP) services. SAP contractors were 
co-located in Job Centers and provided assistance during the first two weeks 
before an applicant received public assistance. SAP providers were paid standard 
fees for the initial assessment but mostly for job placements, 13 and 26 week 
retention, with more paid if the client’s wages eliminated the need for public 
assistance (OC CNY, 2007). One study reported that SAPs were paid $250 per 
person to diagnose potential work barriers, with between $750 and $1,750 per 
person for placement and retention (Fischer, 2001, p.8).
After an applicant was awarded public assistance they were reassigned randomly 
by Job Center staff to one of 11 ESP contractors. ESP provision commenced 
with a ‘rapid work attachment’ phase in the first two weeks after which the 
individual spent two days a week with the ESP provider and three days a week on 
a mandatory Work Experience Placement, usually with a city agency (most notably 
the City Parks Department). ESP provision could include short training courses or 
mandatory treatment programmes. 
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ESP providers were paid only for job entry and retention performance with similar 
milestones as those in SAPs (OC CNY, 2007). The rewards for ESP providers were 
higher. Between 2002 and 2005 they would receive $1,227 for a job placement; 
$2,209 after 13 weeks’ retention or $2,700 in the case of a higher wage job; and 
$491 after 26 weeks’ retention or $1,473 if in a higher wage job and/or the case 
was closed.
The different prices in the two delivery models were designed to reflect the 
potential for creaming. The SAP providers were paid about a third of what an 
ESP provider was paid because they could ‘cream the easy to place‘. This left the 
‘higher payments for the participants needing longer term help‘ (Turner, 2001, 
p. 11). Those who had multiple employment barriers and for whom few job 
outcomes were likely had specialised intensive services paid for separately outside 
the performance-based system (Savas, 2005).
In 2005, alongside a major review of New York’s poverty reduction strategy, it was 
decided to restructure welfare to work provision and to combine SAP, ESP and work 
experience provision into a single back to work programme. The new model was 
designed, in part, in response to criticisms that providers placed few participants 
in sustained employment and that contract incentives did not encourage them to 
invest in the hardest to place (Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, p.3). 
Each Job Center works now with only one prime contractor who is expected to 
provide customised and flexible employment and work experience services and 
work with a service user ‘from start to finish’. The contractor must develop a 
‘Job Retention and Career Plan’ for each participant to document their efforts to 
‘advance’ the individual through skill development and financial planning. 
Contractors receive only a nominal administrative payment for participants not 
placed in jobs, and only partial payment for short-term job placements. The total 
annual funding for the HRA Works programme amounts to $63 million and 
contracts reward the milestones outlined in Table 5.1. A significant feature of this 
model has been the introduction of an additional bonus payment for providers 
who succeed in placing sanctioned benefit claimants. There are few results yet 
available on the impact of the back to work model (Doar, 2007).
At the start of 2005 the city also implemented the WeCARE (Wellness, 
Comprehensive Assessment, Rehabilitation and Employment) programme, to cater 
for the increased numbers in the caseload with multiple and complex barriers to 
employment. 
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Table 5.1 NYC HRA back to work performance milestones
Employment plans
•	 Completion	of	an	Employment	Plan	(pre-employment).
•	 Completion	of	an	Employment	Plan	(post-employment).
Unsubsidised employment
•	 Placement	 into	 unsubsidised	 employment	 for	 30	 days	 (minimum	 20	
hours a week).
•	 Retention	 in	 unsubsidised	 employment	 for	 90	 days	 after	 initial	
placement.
•	 Retention	in	unsubsidised	employment	for	90	days	with	case	closing.
•	 Retention	in	unsubsidised	employment	for	180	days	after	initial	placement	
Retention in unsubsidised employment for 180 days with wage gain.
Incentive/disincentive payments 
•	 Incentive	 payment	 for	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 number	 of	 participants	 who	
have failed to comply with work requirements and whose cases are 
sanctioned.
•	 Incentive	payment	for	an	increase	in	the	rate	of	sanction	removal.
•	 Disincentive	for	an	increase	in	the	public	assistance	recidivism	rate.
•	 Disincentive	for	a	decline	in	administrative	indicators	(e.g.	Employment	
Plan completion and timely attendance notification).
Source: Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, Appendix A.
HRA allocated over $200 million over three years to service about 45,600 benefit 
recipients each year. The programme is delivered by two prime contractors who 
deliver services through sub-contractors. Arbor is owned by the large US provider 
ResCare, and FEGS (Federation Employment and Guidance Service) is a large New 
York-based non-profit organisation. The programme has about 24,000 participants 
at any given point. 
Job Center staff refer eligible individuals to the provider for a bio-psychosocial 
assessment and ‘functional capacity outcome’. By 2007, 7.3 per cent of those 
assessed were found to be fully employable and referred to full engagement 
work activities. 45.7 per cent were ‘employable within limits’ and referred to a 
WeCARE provider for specialised employment services and a work assignment that 
accommodates their disabilities. 37.3 per cent deemed ‘temporarily unemployable’ 
were referred for ‘Wellness Plans’, involving referrals for health interventions to 
improve their condition. Just under ten per cent were considered not employable 
within a year and were assisted by a provider to apply for federal disability benefits. 
Only 3,500 participants had been placed in employment (Doar, 2007).
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The contracts for WeCARE are hybrids. Two-thirds of the prime contractors’ 
potential income is performance-based and milestone-driven; a third is paid for 
services claimed on a monthly basis. This payment system reflects the barriers faced 
by the client group, but remains performance-driven with significant payments for 
sustained employment outcomes. It is unclear from the available literature why 
the performance payments are higher for FEG (see Table 5.2). 
There has been much positive comment on the design of the New York model and 
its potential to improve employment outcomes for some of the hardest to help 
welfare recipients. Critics suggest, however, that the prime ‘contractors and their 
sub-contractors are not adequately translating a good programme into beneficial 
services and support‘ (Kasdan and Youdelman, 2007, p.8). 
Table 5.2 HRA payments to WeCARE contractors for services
Arbor FEGS
Services
1. Phase I bio-psycho-social assessment $260 $250
2. Phase II bio-psycho-social assessment $136 $175
3. Complete wellness/rehabilitation $600 $975
4. DVE/IPE completed $700 $480
5. 12-week cycle of work activities $600 $975
Performance-based milestones
Subsidised employment
6. Employed, 30 days after placement $600 $2,000
7. Employed, 90 days after placement $850 $2,400
8. Employed, 180 days after placement $1,950 $2,960
Unsubsidised employment
9. Employed, 30 days after placement $1,700 $2,500
10. Employed, 90 days after placement $1,800 $2,700
11. Employed, 180 days after placement $1,905 $2,960
SSI/SSDI
12. Attain federal disability benefits  $805 $750
Source: Kasdan and Youdelman, 2007, Appendix D. 
5.3 Milestone payments: the Oklahoma model
The development of milestone payment systems in programmes for people with 
disabilities is closely associated with the Oklahoma model. Introduced as a pilot 
in 1991, it has been subsequently refined and extended to replace fee-for-service 
contracts for the delivery of vocational rehabilitation services. The milestone model 
was used as the template for reform in other states and countries and evaluations 
appear to show that such systems have improved outcomes and reduced costs 
(Corden and Thornton, 2003; O’Brien and Revell, 2005; Gates et al. 2005; DEEWR, 
2007). 
US welfare to work services, employment programmes and differential pricing
39
Oklahama’s milestone contracts specify a series of distinct and critical achievements 
that must be met prior to payment with the greater percentage (60 per cent) 
of contractor income tied to output, quality and job outcome performance. The 
structure of the milestones differed slightly depending on whether the participant 
had mental health or developmental disabilities, but the basic model is outlined 
in Table 5.3. The purchaser also created a two-tier system of payments through 
which service providers would be paid higher fees for service users designated as 
‘highly challenged’. This premium was typically about 30 per cent, from $1,000 to 
$2,000 more than the regular payment (Frumkin, 2001). 
Table 5.3 Oklahoma Milestone Approach
Determination of need (process) 10%
Vocational preparation (process) 10%
Job placement (output) 10%
Job training (process) 10%
Job retention (quality/outcome) 15%
Job stabilisation (outcome) 20%
Case closure (outcome) 25%
Source: Frumkin, 2001, p. 12.
The new contracts were introduced with competitive bidding. According to 
the designer and implementer of the model, the bidding process forced service 
providers ‘to compete against the average, bringing down the high, the very 
inefficient providers, pressuring them to move towards the average‘ (Frumkin, 
2001, p. 13). Once the bids were received, the purchaser evaluated them by 
looking at the per-user bid price and the average cost per closure, as well as past 
history and the geographical area served. The purchaser then agreed a final price 
with the provider. Case managers monitored delivery and documentation was 
required at each stage to ensure progress and trigger payments.
A 1997 survey found that 13 of the 16 providers on the new model showed 
improvements in all areas. Waiting lists had been reduced by half, time before job 
placement reduced by 18 per cent and cost per closure dropped by 25 per cent. 
There also had been a reduction of one-third in the paperwork required by the 
older fee-for-service system. By 2000 it cost the state $10,740 on average to bring 
a case to closure compared with an average cost of $22,000 in 1991 (Frumkin, 
2001, p. 15, p. 18).
The new contracting process resulted in problems for some providers who chose 
not to bid or who struggled to meet performance standards and so lost contracts. 
An important criticism was that of creaming, with about a third of providers saying 
they were more selective (albeit two-thirds said it had no effect). The designer of the 
new model accepted the need for ‘vigilance’ but argued that higher payments for 
the ‘highly challenged‘ offset creaming. The purchaser also had used a ‘stochastic 
probability model’ in the bidding process to calculate the risk that a provider faced. 
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This enabled them to incorporate into the payment the amount of risk involved 
and by making that risk more manageable reduced any pressure on the provider 
to cream. Some providers argued, however, that the larger payment did not offset 
the higher risk and cost involved and some were ‘hesitant to work with difficult 
clients‘ (Frumkin, 2001, p. 19).
Another weakness was that the number of people who could be recruited by 
a provider was capped. Once successful providers recruited the number specified 
in their contract they either had to stop accepting new participants or provide 
a free service until a new contract began. In some cases the purchaser brought 
forward the start date of a new contract but was reported, in the evaluation, to 
be considering longer-term solutions. One possibility was the creation of open 
ended contracts. Another was the introduction of a voucher system, allowing 
service users, or those able to act for them, to choose their provider (Frumkin, 
2001, p. 20).
5.6  JTPA and WIA employment and training 
programmes and ‘cream-skimming’
The performance standards established under the JTPA served as the ‘prototype’ 
for their extension into other federal employment and training programmes 
(Heinrich, 1999). JTPA performance standards evolved continuously between 
1982 and 2000, when its services were incorporated into the reforms initiated by 
the WIA (1998). WIA brought together multiple federal funding programmes for 
coordinated delivery through a network of ‘one stop career centres’. States, local 
delivery areas and providers are held accountable for their performance against 
standards that include job placement rates, earnings, retention in employment 
and skills and qualifications obtained. Failure to meet the standards can lead to 
financial sanctions whereas high performance is rewarded by incentives. Service 
providers must meet performance standards to remain eligible for WIA funds. 
As with JTPA WIA training and employment services are targeted at disadvantaged 
groups, including the adult unemployed, young unemployed people and welfare 
recipients. Delivery is devolved to individual states with some latitude to modify 
and augment performance standards. Most delivery centres sub-contract service 
delivery to public, for-profit and non-profit organisations and use subsidiary 
performance standards systems in their contracts with providers.
From its introduction there was a continuous debate about whether JTPA performance 
measures motivated service providers to work with the more easily placed and whether 
services should be targeted at those most in need or those most able to benefit 
(GAO, 1989). Detailed evaluations found that managers of JTPA services responded 
to performance incentives by organising service delivery to maximise measured 
performance. These incentives were strongly reinforced in the performance-based 
contracts given to providers. Indeed, there was evidence that contracts with sub-
contractors had higher performance standards to provide the purchaser with greater 
confidence that it would meet state standards (Heinrich, 1999).
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The proportion of outcome payments in JTPA programmes tended to be far lower 
than that used in the UK. One review found that, typically, the proportion of 
funding that depended on outcomes ranged between ten and 20 per cent. The 
‘US performance system relies more on procedural sticks than [outcome] carrots‘ 
(Felstead, 1998, p. 47).
Participation in JTPA services was voluntary and the resources available meant 
that no more than five per cent of potential user groups could participate. 
Federal eligibility rules themselves acted to check ‘cream-skimming’ but detailed 
econometric findings showed that strong performance incentives encouraged the 
selection of more job-ready applicants and less willingness to use more intensive 
and expensive training provision. Even when case managers indicated a desire to 
help the most disadvantaged, analyses of their actual referrals to services showed 
that the ‘probability of meeting the standard was the most statistically significant 
and numerically influential factor in selecting applicants‘ (Heckman et al. 1997, 
p. 393). Multivariate analysis of inter-state variations in incentive regimes and 
recruitment trends found that ‘high incentive regions encourage enrolment of 
the more able individuals from the eligible pool‘ (Cragg, 1997, cited in Felstead, 
1998, p. 46).
The results from several detailed evaluations suggest, however, that fears of 
policy induced ‘cream-skimming’ were exaggerated, and that the creaming which 
occurred had ‘no effect on mean impacts‘ (Barnow and Smith, 2004, p.274). 
It appears rather that the lack of information available to eligible participants 
and the choices they made played the ‘major role in accounting for demographic 
disparities in programme participation‘ (Heckman et al. 2005, p. 392). Over 
time JTPA programme designers redefined performance standards to reduce 
opportunities for such ‘dysfunctional behaviours’ (Courty and Marscke, 2003). 
In the US there has been continuing debate on performance measurement. The 
federal government has introduced ‘common measures’ of performance across a 
wide range of employment and training programmes, including welfare to work 
services. There remain concerns, however, that the measures will encourage cream-
skimming with reform proposals calling for the development of an ‘adjustment 
requirement’ to allow for the economic or demographic characteristics, or known 
barriers to employment, of individual participants. In an interesting development 
individual states have proposed, and are testing, their own ‘return on investment’ 
performance standards that seek more accurate measurements of the net impacts 
and social returns of employment programmes, which can be used to drive 
provider behaviour (Rubinstein and Mayo, 2007). Such methodologies may merit 
further investigation.
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5.7  Performance-based outcomes and the most 
disadvantaged
There is a trade-off between obtaining timely measures of performance and 
accurate ones. Programme managers and purchasers need shorter measurement 
periods than in more rigorous net impact evaluations, but the evidence from JTPA 
evaluations is that ‘short term measures are especially vulnerable to manipulation‘ 
(Courty and Marschake, 2003). 
One significant finding from the JTPA evaluations was that the relatively short-term 
employment-related performance standards measured were ‘either uncorrelated 
with or negatively corroborated with net value added, especially in the long run‘ 
(Heckman et al. 2005, p. 392). In a comprehensive review of the JTPA evidence 
Barnow and Smith suggest that the revised approach to performance standards 
introduced by WIA has taken the delivery system ‘farther away from the evidence 
than it was before‘ (2004, p. 276). WIA has incorporated more programmes and 
established 17 performance standards that are now negotiated with individual 
states rather than based on a standard model as with JTPA. Evaluators discern that 
the implementation of these new standards appears to be ‘generating inappropriate 
incentives for programme managers to improve measured performance rather 
than service access or quality‘ (Heinrich, 2004). Amongst other recommendations 
Burnow and Smith emphasise the necessity for longer-term research to determine 
‘short-term outcome measures that are reliably correlated with long-run programme 
impacts and cannot be gamed by local programs‘ (2004, p. 275). 
With regard to high quality welfare to work evaluations, the evidence is mixed 
on the relationship between performance standards and longer-term outcomes. 
One Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) review of such 
evaluations suggested that many performance indicators ‘appear to work poorly 
for a wide range of people‘. When the results from studies that measured three-
year effects were disaggregated for the most disadvantaged groups it was found 
that average earnings levels ‘are a fairly good, though not perfect, indicator of 
which programmes were most effective‘ and that the programmes involved ‘had 
among the largest impacts for the most disadvantaged‘ (Michalopoulos, 2004, p. 
29, p. 30). This suggests that performance standards that measure earnings levels 
could be an important signal of effectiveness in a differential pricing system.
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6  Differential pricing in the 
British welfare market
The UK was the first European country to make extensive use of ‘output related 
funding’ (ORF). This was the culmination of a reform process aimed at increasing 
the effectiveness of employment and training programmes. 
The most radical development occurred in 1988 when responsibility for purchasing 
training programmes was transferred from the public sector to a national network 
of local TECs in England and Wales and LECs in Scotland.9 These independent, 
employer-led companies were funded increasingly on the basis of achieved 
training or employment outcomes, a funding system they also used with their 
sub-contractors. The Employment Service continued to separately purchase job 
search assistance programmes and it too placed greater emphasis on competitive 
bidding and rewarding providers for securing job outcomes.
6.1 The TEC funding system 
The TEC network delivered a wide range of training and enterprise programmes 
but most of the budget received was for the delivery of Youth Training (YT) 
and Training for Work (TfW). In 1993/94, for example, the overall TEC annual 
budget	was	£2.4	billion	of	which	£1.8	billion	was	for	YT	and	TfW.	There	was	an	
endorsement process within both YT and TfW through which specific hard to help 
trainees were identified and attracted higher prices (see Figure 6.1).
The Employment Department (ED) of the Department for Education and Employment 
negotiated annual contracts with each TEC which agreed a contract price with 
targets for completed training weeks, volumes of participants and outputs. Young 
people were steered towards obtaining Level 2 National Vocational Qualifications 
(NVQs). In the case of unemployed adult trainees there was greater emphasis on 
9 The review evidence was concerned mainly with the experience of TECs, 
although many of the developments described and issues raised applied 
equally to the training programmes of the Scottish LECs.
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job outcomes, measured 13 weeks after a person completed training. Individual 
TECs	had	annual	budgets	of	between	£15	and	£50	million	(Bennett	et al. 1994). 
There was no variation in training week payments but ORF was introduced in 
1990/91 when it comprised ten per cent of TEC budgets. It was assessed in relation 
to a points score weighted to reflect the policy value placed on qualification levels 
and job outcomes. The proportion of ORF funding increased to between 25 and 40 
per cent in 1993/94. At this point seven TECS also moved to a 25 per cent: 75 per 
cent ‘starts and outcomes’ model for their TfW provision that was subsequently 
extended. By 1997 output payments accounted for between 25 and 35 per cent 
of the YT budget and 75 per cent of the TfW budget. ORF funding was also 
introduced to Scottish LECs from 1992/93.
There initially were other allowances covering certain expenses, such as workplace 
adaptations, trainee travel costs and childcare costs. These would often be paid 
as supplements to training weeks paid to providers but dissipated with the 
introduction of the ORF payment system. 
TECs had considerable flexibility over their budgets including the capacity 
to generate surpluses, although these had to be spent in meeting wider TEC 
objectives. In addition, TECs were given a smaller allocation for a local initiative 
fund, often used, in part, for targeted provision for particular groups including, for 
example, minority communities or otherwise ‘harder to help’ populations. 
The Government introduced a competitive performance related funding bonus 
that was paid into the initiative fund. This was allocated on the basis of how well 
the TEC had met wider strategic Government priorities including, for example, 
the number of trainees with disabilities who got a job outcome or the number 
of those assisted who lived in designated inner city or special areas. This funding 
accounted	for	a	small	proportion	of	TEC	budgets.	 In	1992/93,	£26	million	was	
allocated to over 60 TECs (Finn, 1994).
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Figure 6.1  Youth Training and Training for Work special needs 
endorsements
YT was largely for 16- and 17-year old school leavers and replaced the earlier 
Youth Training Scheme (YTS). YTS had distinct ‘modes’ of funding. Mode ‘A’ 
had lower unit prices to reflect the direct involvement of employers and was 
often delivered by private agencies. Mode B typically was delivered by local 
authorities and voluntary sector organisations with higher unit prices. The 
introduction of YT ended the formal separation of provision but introduced 
special arrangements for harder to place young people whereby the Careers 
Service would ‘endorse’ young people with special needs into three primary 
categories:
•	 Category	A:	trainees	who	require	a	period	of	initial	training	before	being	
able to move into mainstream training.
•	 Category	B:	trainees	who,	even	with	additional	support	counselling	and	
guidance, are unlikely to achieve a Level 2 NVQ within a reasonable time 
scale (approximately two to three years).
•	 Category	 C:	 trainees	 who,	 with	 additional	 support	 counselling	 and	
guidance, would be able to achieve a Level 2 NVQ within a reasonable 
time scale.
Young people who had literacy or numeracy needs which significantly 
impaired their opportunities in the labour market would be endorsed as 
Calegory L or N.
Young people endorsed as Category B could follow a programme leading 
to a Level 1 NVQ which, once awarded, carried a 50 per cent premium on 
the payment of a mainstream NVQ. Those young people endorsed as C or 
as ‘requiring significant support and help’ could follow non-NVQ basic skills 
courses which, once achieved, carried the same payment and points as a 
mainstream NVQ2 (Felstead, 1998).
TfW was introduced in 1992 replacing earlier programmes. It was targeted 
at adults who had been unemployed for over six months who would usually 
be referred to a contracted provider by the Employment Service following a 
Restart interview. The objective of TfW was to assist longer-term unemployed 
people into employment and/or improve their vocational skills. There was 
an endorsement process for TfW participants but only for those with  
self-disclosed literacy and/or numeracy barriers who would attract output 
points for achieving basic ‘Wordpower’ and ‘Numberpower’ certificates. 
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6.2 TECs and contracted providers
TECs acted as area-based prime contractors and within the limits determined by 
their own contract with the Department, had flexibility to develop contractual and 
payment terms with providers. By 1994 there was wide variation in TEC pricing 
strategies and in what they paid providers, both for training weeks and for ORF 
(ED, 1994; Finn, 1994). Many paid flat rate fees for training weeks delivered with 
differential payments for high cost occupational areas, such as engineering, and 
for those with endorsed special needs. Some TECs also differentiated prices by the 
nature of the provider, for example, paying different rates to local and national 
providers, or to employer-led bodies. 
An ED survey reported that all the TECs contacted paid higher prices to training 
providers who recruited endorsed special needs trainees, but there was no 
consistent approach and they were incurring deficits on these allocations. This 
Departmental survey also concluded that there was ‘little evidence to suggest that 
TECs derive their broader price range from a detailed knowledge of costs‘, or ‘that 
any one method is more effective than another‘ (ED, 1994, paras 39 and 53).
6.3 The impact of output related funding
The outcome funding model for TfW specified that 25 per cent of the agreed 
total amount for the trainee would be paid per start, with a minimum of 75 per 
cent for the total outcome payment. Outcome payments were weighted with job 
entries paid significantly more than qualification attainment or entry into full time 
education. TEC budgets included some extra weighting to reflect the duration of 
unemployment prior to entering TfW and whether or not a trainee had special 
training needs. In the seven areas where the new model was piloted, the 13-week 
rule for collecting evidence on employment status was relaxed, with TECs and 
their providers able to collect evidence ‘on any day within 13 weeks of leaving the 
programme‘ (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995, p.6).
The performance of these TECs was matched to other comparable TECs on the 
existing arrangements. There was a significant increase in outcomes under the 
new system, although the actual performance gain was lower when calculated 
from a wider survey of outcomes for ex-trainees. The evaluators attributed 20 
per cent of the improvement to the new funding regime and 25 per cent to the 
13-week rule change. Other tests showed that over 90 per cent of the jobs claimed 
for under the more relaxed evidence rule had lasted at least 13 weeks (Coopers & 
Lybrand, 1995).
This performance gain was associated with a greater degree of selectivity with ‘a 
possible reduction in the proportion of [special needs] trainees recruited‘ and signs 
that providers were targeting trainees who were ‘6 to 12 months unemployed 
(and particularly those just over six months unemployed) who appear to be 
the most likely group to secure a positive outcome‘ (Coopers & Lybrand, 2005, 
p. 59). 
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Whilst providers remained willing to recruit trainees with literacy and numeracy 
problems, where the risks involved in obtaining qualification outcomes were 
known and achievable, there was greater hesitancy about taking on the very long 
term unemployed. Providers suggested that the payment weightings that TECs 
passed on were not adequate to offset the risk (Coopers & Lybrand, 2005, p. 42). 
The evaluators suggested that provision available through other channels might be 
more appropriate because TfW was explicitly designed as a selective programme 
targeted at individuals who, with appropriate training, were likely to secure a job 
outcome.
When the full ORF system was extended to TfW nationally it intensified the debate 
about creaming and the adequacy of provision for special needs training. It was 
reported that the increased emphasis on outcomes, especially job outcomes, had 
forced many providers to be more selective, leaving specialist voluntary sector 
providers with the ‘harder to place’ participants thereby undermining their viability. 
This was intensified by budget reductions to TfW of 18 per cent between 1994/95 
and 1995/96 (HoC EC SC, 1996, p. xi). 
The Government argued that the impact was mitigated by the system of 
weightings and bonuses it had introduced requiring, for example, TECs to ensure 
that the absolute numbers of TfW trainees with special needs, disabilities or 18- 
to 24-years olds who were long-term unemployed was maintained in 1995/96. It 
rejected calls, however, to ring-fence budgets for disadvantaged trainees, although 
it subsequently conceded that these restrictions might be implemented for poor 
performing TECs (HoC EC SC, 1996, p. xli).
6.4 The demise of TECs
There are mixed reviews of the performance of TECs and of the impact of the 
programmes they delivered (for a review see: HoC EC SC, 1996). There was 
continuous controversy about the impact of ORF and expenditure reductions 
on the adequacy of TEC provision for disadvantaged trainees. The additional 
incentives in the TEC funding system for ensuring that their needs were met were 
weak compared with the greater outcome and funding pressures on mainstream 
budgets that were transmitted to providers through contracts. Over time the 
funding system shifted the focus of YT and TfW activity towards lower cost 
provision that marginalised provision for higher cost trainees in general and special 
needs groups in particular. 
TECs had considerable flexibility in shaping their own priorities, including the 
discretionary funding they allocated for special needs and other disadvantaged 
groups (Meager and Honey, 1993). There were major differences in how each 
TEC determined its priorities, with some attaching little importance to special 
needs training (Bennett et al. 1994). The consequence was significant variation 
in the availability and adequacy of provision for the most disadvantaged, even 
in neighbouring areas. Given the political controversies that emerged, many 
Differential pricing in the British welfare market
48
TEC directors themselves felt somewhat ‘under siege’ on these issues, subject to 
conflicting demands and pressures from different interest groups on the one hand 
and conflicting or ambiguous requirements from the Department on the other 
(Meager, 1995; HoC EC SC, 1996).
Other problems emerged about TEC-related payment systems with critical National 
Audit Office and Parliamentary reports (NAO, 1995, 1996). These highlighted 
poor audit practices and ‘gaming’ in the system with duplicated and incorrect 
payments, inadequate supporting evidence for claims from some providers, and 
high level TEC reserves (Bennett, 1994). There were high profile cases of providers 
registering non-existent trainees and placing trainees in temporary employment 
for a short time to trigger job outcome payments (Jones, 1999). There were also 
criticisms of the governance of particular TECs and in 1999 a White Paper criticised 
the complex funding, administration and contracting system for TECs and their 
providers which at its worst ‘absorb[s] resources which would otherwise benefit 
the trainee‘ (DfEE, 1999, p. 19). 
The White Paper led to creation of the national network of Learning and Skills 
Councils and the decision to end TEC operating licences in April 2001. The 
Learning and Skills Council was made responsible for distributing funding for all 
post-compulsory school age education and training (apart from Higher Education), 
and Work Based Learning for Adults, which had replaced TfW, was transferred to 
the Employment Service.
6.5 Employment Zones and differential pricing
Since 1997 there have been changes in how the Employment Service, Jobcentre 
Plus and DWP contract with external providers for the delivery of employment 
programmes. Whilst the emphasis on outcome-related funding has been increased 
somewhat, for example, in the New Deal for Young People, the only significant 
use of differential pricing has been within EZs.
EZ providers have considerable flexibility in how they deliver services and the 
funding model rewards both sustained employment and the speed with which 
they place people into work. The core funding model for long-term unemployed 
participants combines a commencement fee for completing an action plan, with 
benefit transfer and output-related funding payments. It combined outcome 
payments with additional incentives. After completion of the action plan, the zone 
provider receives an average of 21 weeks JSA payment for each participant, but is 
responsible for paying the individual participant for up to 26 weeks. The transfer 
of responsibility for benefit payments provides an incentive to move participants 
into work quickly, as the provider would retain any of the surplus not used within 
21 weeks, but the liability for the extra five weeks, payment was an incentive for 
the provider not to ‘park’ an individual. Different terms apply to voluntary lone 
parent participants but the reward system for 13-week job placements is similar 
to that for unemployed participants who must participate.
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Initially the EZ model also included a higher payment premium for participants 
who had been unemployed for longer periods. This weighted mechanism was 
subsequently dropped in favour of higher payments for those participants who were 
referred again after a previous period of EZ participation. This was ‘considered to 
be a more accurate indicator of the degree of difficulty‘ the participant represented 
(Griffiths and Durkin, 2007, p. 16). The EZ synthesis evaluation report gives no 
further information on the impact of such differential payments.
The EZ evaluations typically contrasted zone impacts with those of the more 
standardised interventions delivered through New Deal provision for the long-
term unemployed. The EZ model is seen as having somewhat better outcomes, 
largely attributed to their flexibility, the greater continuity and discretion of zone 
case managers and the performance funding model. The synthesis report found 
no evidence from the evaluations that zones achieved their better performance 
through creaming or parking participants than did comparator New Deals (Griffiths 
and Durkin, 2007, p. 57- p. 60).
This does not mean, however, that case managers, personal advisers or providers 
do not prioritise, in light of their objectives and resources, those with whom they 
work most intensively. Other evidence from the zones, and elsewhere, suggests 
that front line advisers rate new participants both on informal and formal 
employability scales deciding on those they can assist into sustained employment 
and those who are more responsive and committed to the support on offer (see, 
for example, Martin, 2002; Hirst et al. 2002; Griffiths and Jones, 2005). Front line 
rationing of employment assistance appears an inevitable outcome of the limits 
of the available funding, the available job opportunities and the tractability of the 
barriers faced by some of the hardest to help.
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7  Conclusion: policy 
implications 
There are contending views on the success of performance-based contracting in 
the countries reviewed, although evaluations suggest that the Australian, British 
and Dutch systems typically improve the short-term job prospects of participants 
by between five and ten per cent, and do so more quickly than more standardised 
programmes (ACOSS, 2008).10 It is difficult, however, to make robust comparisons 
or to disaggregate the impacts of contract design from those of other policy 
changes. It is still harder to isolate the relationship between different contract prices 
and the impacts of employment programmes, although cost benefit analyses give 
some insight into financial effectiveness.
The evidence reviewed suggests that minimising creaming and parking is a key 
challenge in performance-based and output-related funding systems. The challenge 
for policy designers is to construct systems that militate against such processes 
whilst maintaining the capacity of providers to manage the risks involved, achieve 
employment outcomes and be confident of securing returns on their investment.
In many systems it seems that employment outcomes are measured with little 
reference to participant characteristics but the different systems reviewed have 
sought to target assistance in different ways. These range from the definition or 
endorsement of eligible groups to be served; through to the requirement that 
particular quotas of participants with greater needs are represented amongst 
outcomes; through to the design of specific tenders that target services at particular 
hard to help groups. There also is evidence of the need for specialist supplementary 
outcome focused provision, as in the Australian PSP or NYC WeCARE. These 
10 There are a number of reasons why micro-economic net impact studies may 
underestimate the longer-run and aggregate impact of welfare to work 
services and employment programmes, and there is evidence from the US 
that the impacts of such reforms have been greater than those captured in 
the results from randomly assigned control group evaluations (Grubb, 2004, 
p. 367).
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combine rewards for providers who achieve necessary milestones and employment 
outcomes. Such provision is particularly important for groups who need to stabilise 
their circumstances as part of their involvement in, or progression to, ‘work first’ 
programmes, as already occurs in GB with ‘progress2work’ and was envisaged 
within the proposals for ‘Building on New Deal’ (DWP, 2004).
Differential payments were used in the two-tier system in NYC in anticipation 
of creaming, but this now has been replaced by unified provision but with 
significant bonuses for placing one particular group – those who have been 
sanctioned. Australia has a more comprehensive differential pricing system where 
highly disadvantaged job seekers attract premium payments for services and 
for the outcomes secured. The challenge has been to devise an evidence-based 
classification and pricing system that targets the hardest to help, is relatively easy 
to administer and does not create perverse incentives by, for example, encouraging 
a provider to delay job placement to attract a higher payment. Policy makers 
also found it necessary to buttress such incentives with quarantined funds for 
employment barrier reduction, greater scrutiny of parking and adjustments to the 
Star Rating system.
Alternative funding models have been proposed that suggest ways in which the 
pricing and contracting system may be used to encourage providers to work with 
higher risk and higher cost participants without such regulation. There is some 
evidence from the Netherlands, for example, that such a ‘progressive pricing’ 
system is being utilised where contractors receive increased premiums in line with 
the proportion of a fixed cohort of cases they place into employment. 
The Australian Productivity Commission proposed that its Government consider ‘a 
stepped or marginal payment system ... that increases payment levels as outcome 
rates increase‘ (PC, 2002, p. 10.6). It suggested that JN providers be offered a 
choice between an outcome contract in which prices were set administratively, or 
a more risky contract. The latter would allow higher prices for those providers to 
achieve higher outcome rates – but with lower returns than from administrative 
pricing should such higher outcome rates not be realised. This would mean that 
if the high risk provider secured the average outcome rate the rewards would be 
lower than under administrative pricing, but if they exceeded them they would 
secure premium payments (PC, 2002, p. 10.7):
Example
Providers achieving outcome rates below 20 per cent might receive payments 
that are only 80 per cent of the administrative price, but those achieving 
outcomes between 20 and 30 per cent might receive a ten per cent premium, 
those achieving from 30 to 40 per cent, a 30 per cent premium, and those 
achieving above 40 per cent, a 50 per cent premium. 
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Such a system might create the right kind of incentives to ensure that providers 
invest in additional services, such as smaller caseloads, enabling them to place more 
of the caseload into sustained employment. The Commission anticipated some of 
the weaknesses in the proposal, such as the loss of client choice, as participants 
would be randomly assigned between providers. Whilst the Commission suggested 
that these issues could be addressed and modelled more elaborate designs for 
the incentives, it still acknowledged the complexity of their implementation (see 
the Appendix). The Australian Department chose, however, not to take up the 
suggested proposal.
Another possible model – a ‘target accelerator’ – has been suggested by Work 
Directions. This envisages the potential of a long-term framework partnership 
agreement between DWP and a provider around agreed outcomes, such as 
moving a specified proportion of a particular claimant population into sustained 
employment. The flexibility of the agreement would encourage joint investment 
and innovation and be driven by a ‘funding gradient where financial rewards 
increase incrementally based on the percentage of the eligible population moved 
into work‘. The differential fees for each segment of the claimant population would 
require the provider to ‘dig deeper into the caseload‘ to ensure their financial 
viability and profitability (Mansoor and Johnson, 2006, p. 12).
The scale of the outcome payments would escalate over time as various ‘triggers’ 
were reached and would be split between initial job outcome and at 13 and 26 
weeks sustained employment. The authors outline how the proposed model would 
work, with two different scenarios of how the financial costs would accelerate in 
relation to job outcomes attained. They suggest that the model has the ‘potential 
to change significantly the appearance and consequence of social exclusion in a 
medium-sized city‘ with much of the risk borne by the provider, ‘with reward for 
success mitigating that social risk‘ (Mansoor and Johnson, 2006, p. 15).
In a critical review of the FND funding model, the Social Market Foundation argues 
for reforms that would better shape the balance of ‘risk and reward’ and induce 
providers to work with the harder to help (Mulheirn and Menne, 2008). They 
suggest, for example, that service providers might be offered higher service fees 
for working with the harder to help, but also face a fine – a ‘negative outcome 
payment’ – if the provider is unsuccessful. They propose also a version of the 
‘accelerator model’ where providers would be paid higher payments as the total 
percentage of a cohort of participants entering sustained employment increases.
These proposed models are untested but address some of the key issues reviewed in 
this study. They appear to provide incentives that would result in more participants 
entering employment and avoid complex mechanisms for individual assessments 
and price enhancements for the harder to help. They balance risk and reward 
between purchaser and provider and, in the case of the target accelerator, remove 
the disincentives of capped budgets for over-performance. Notwithstanding the 
practical issues that need to be addressed such a model merits experimental testing 
to gauge its impact on performance and costs, its potential to assist harder to help 
participants and whether it would militate against creaming and parking.
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Whilst such models may incentivise providers to ‘dig deeper into the caseload’ 
they may still mean that many harder to help participants are parked. There 
may be merit also in testing differential service fees and payments focused on 
particular hard to help groups, such as those with a combination of three or four 
easily identified significant barriers to employment. Such enhanced payments may 
encourage providers to undertake a more intensive assessment of the individuals’ 
problems, needs and underlying barriers and so work harder with those most in 
need. Such a payment system may add to administrative complexity but it would 
potentially target resources directly at the harder to help, meet the greater costs 
faced by providers and reward their efforts. 
To ensure value for money the enhanced individual service and outcome payment 
could be conditionally linked to a measure of earnings gain as well as employment 
sustainability. The dilemma always remains, however, that the provider may not 
respond to such individual incentives and may simply reap a windfall gain if a 
designated participant secures the appropriate outcome.
7.1 Creaming and parking in the Flexible New Deal
It seems clear that minimising creaming and parking within FND rests on a 
combination of policy design, including any identification and pricing for the most 
disadvantaged, and effective scrutiny and management of performance.
An immediate approach to the FND, might be to track the hardest to help and 
adapt the differential pricing approach that has been used in EZs. To promote 
working with the hardest to help DWP should monitor participation and placement 
patterns for service users with characteristics that suggest they are furthest 
away from immediate employment. Such characteristics need to be carefully 
defined but could be selected from length of time on benefits, basic skill barriers, 
homelessness, criminal record, substance misuse, returners to the New Deal, or 
whether a person has been sanctioned. Jobcentre Plus already has markers in its 
management information system to identify some of these characteristics which 
would be still more accurate after an individual has been with Jobcentre Plus for 
as much as a year of unemployment. 
Tracking providers’ performance with these groups would discourage creaming 
and deliver the message that providers must help all referrals to make progress 
towards a sustained job. This could be reinforced through contract management 
and by recognition in the Star Rating system.
An equally pragmatic response to reduce parking in the system could be achieved 
through careful regulation of referral flows, so that providers and their case 
managers have more incentive to work intensively with those participants they 
already have, rather than wait for more job-ready clients to arrive.
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Appendix 1: Productivity Commission modelling of Incentive contracts that 
allow price variations 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PC, 2002, p. 10.7
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